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Whether a lien fulfills the requirements of specificity stated above is a
matter of federal law. 9
 A state court's characterization of a lien as specific
and choate, while entitled to consideration, is not binding on the federal
courts.'9
 On the other hand, if the state court decides that the lien is
inchoate, as was done in the instant case, this classification is practically
conclusive,"
The doctrine of the inchoate lien has been the subject of severe criti-
cism.'2
 One critic has pointed out that the concept of the inchoate lien as
created by the Supreme Court has subsequently been enlarged to include
practically every lien to be found in American law.' 3 The most valid
criticism seems to be that it does not apply to federal tax liens. The federal
tax lien is not regarded as an inchoate general lien, but a specific and per-
fected lien which without the aid of any subsequent court action attaches to
the property of the tax debtor."
The problem of the inchoate lien probably would not have arisen had
the Supreme Court adhered to a holding that the priority of liens be based
upon a "first in time, first in right theory" which they seemed to follow in an
earlier case.' However, since the Court did not subsequently follow the
rule it has become, in this regard, purely academic." It is felt that Congress
could ameliorate the situation presented in the instant case by providing that
when an attachment lien is followed by judgment, the judgment should re-
late back to the date of the attachment and thereby the priority of the lien
be preserved. There seems to be no indication, however, of any Congres-
sional action in this respect within the immediate future."
THEODORE C. REGNANTE
Taxation—Federal Income—Statutory Interpretation—Useful Life-
Salvage Value.—Hertz Corporation v. United States.'—The corporate
taxpayer was engaged in the business of renting automobiles and trucks,
the former of which had a useful life to it of less than three years but a
physical life of four. In preparing the federal income tax returns for the
years 1954, 1955, and 1956, the taxpayer claimed depreciation on the auto-
mobiles on the basis of the four year physical life using the declining
balance method at a rate of fifty per cent per year on the undepreciated
9 United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
10 United States v. Waddell, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
31
 Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, supra note 5, at 371.
12 MacLachlan, Improving the Laws of Federal Liens and Priority, 1 B. C. Ind.
& Corn. L. Rev. 73 (1959).
15 Kennedy, The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Liens, 63 Yale
L.J. 905 (1954).
14 Note, 22 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 583, 588 (1954).
15 United States v. City of New Britian, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
16 Comment, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 829 (1956).
17 MacLachlan, supra note 12, at 82.
1 268 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1959).
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balance without a salvage value limitation. Taxpayer paid estimated taxes
each year and applied for a refund based on the difference between the
estimated taxes paid and those finally computed. Since the Commissioner
failed to take action on the claims within six months, the taxpayer brought
suit for the refund in the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware.2 On judgment for the taxpayer,8 the government appealed. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed holding that "useful life"
as defined in § 167(c) of the IRC of 1954 means the useful life of the asset
to the taxpayer. Therefore, taxpayer had to use the less than three year
life in the computation of its depreciation on the automobiles. Because of
the shortening of the life, the taxpayer was precluded from using the
declining balance method of depreciation. 4 Since the trucks had a useful life
to the taxpayer of more than three years the declining balance method was
appropriate. However, in using this method, the court decided that deprecia-
tion could not be claimed below a reasonable salvage value.
The various Courts of Appeals have split on the interpretation of the
useful life concept. In Evans v. Commissioner of Internal Revenues the
Ninth Circuit decided that the concept meant the physical life of the
asset without regard to taxpayer's actual holding period. In reaching this
decision the court rejected the Commissioner's interpretation of similar
language in the 1954 Code.° The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Massey
Motors, Inc.7 accepted the Commissioner's interpretation holding that useful
life to the taxpayer is the accepted meaning of "useful life." However, the
court may have been influenced by the fact that the depreciated assets were
sold at a price greater than the original cost within the same taxable year
in which they were purchased by the taxpayer.° The Hertz9 decision
adopted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit.
The Third Circuit in Hertzw is the first of the circuits to decide a case
testing the validity of the Commissioner's Regulations which forbid deprecia-
tion below a reasonable salvage value when the declining balance method
is elected by the taxpayer." The court in making its determination of legis-
lative intent with respect to this issue confined itself to a particular Con-
-gressional hearing. It seemingly ignored reports by the Senate Finance
Committee showing that Congress may have intended that salvage value
2 1954 IRC § 7422 and § 6532.
3 165 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1958).
4 1954 IRC § 167(c).
5 264 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1959).
6 Income Tax Regulations (1954 Code) § 1.167(a)(1)(b) provides in part
that ". . the estimated useful life of an asset . . . is the period over which the asset
may reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayers on his trade or business. . . ."
7 264 F.2d .552 (5th Cir. 1959).
8 Cf. Cohn v. United States, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1959) where the court held that
depreciation could be disallowed in the year of sale where the asset was sold at a profit.
9 See supra note 1.
10 See supra note 1.
ll Income Tax Regulations (1954 Code) § 1.167(b)(2)(a).
317
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
be built into the declining balance method and need not be considered by
the taxpayer.12
The Hertz Corporation has applied for and been granted certiorari
in the United States Supreme Court. 13
 It is submitted that the Third Cir-
cuit's interpretation of useful life could have been better substantiated by
consideration of the fundamental concept of depreciation. The depreciation
deduction should effect the distribution of the cost of a tangible capital
asset over its estimated useful life in a systematic and rational manner.
The deduction should seek to set off the cost of an asset against the income
produced by it during its life. Actual physical life of an asset, if different
from the holding period of the taxpayer, should be irrelevant.
The ability of the taxpayer to depreciate the asset below a reasonable
salvage value is of great importance as a capital gain tax would be paid
on any gain arising from the sale of the asset while depreciation is charged
against ordinary income. The Supreme Court's problem in this issue
will be to weigh the importance of the capital gain to the taxpayer on the
sale of the depreciated property against the need for additional tax revenue.
Whatever the final decision, it is probable that Congress has not spoken
its last word on the subject.
ALLAN B. SOLOMON
United States Arbitration Act—Stay of Proceedings—Declaration of
National Law—Fraud as an Arbitrable Issue.—Robert Lawrence Co.,
Inc. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.'—A Massachusetts buyer brought an
action for damages in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, jurisdiction being grounded on diversity of citizen-
ship, for alleged fraud in the inducement of a purchase agreement requiring
interstate shipment of goods. The disputed contract, made in New York
with a New York seller, contained an arbitration clause covering "any com-
plaint, controversy, or question which may arise." The defendant seller
moved to stay the legal proceedings pending arbitration, relying on § 3 of
the United States Arbitration Act. 2 The District Court denied the motion,
12 Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (1954) which in essence says that
salvage value is not applicable because at the expiration of the useful life there remains
an undepreciated balance which represents salvage value; Sen. Rep. No, 1622, 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 203 (1954) which in substance states that the limitation of a three
year life was placed on the declining method so that the asset could not be completely
depredated in the year of purchase.
13 361 U.S. 811 (1959).
1
 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted 28 U.S.L. Week 3259 (1960).
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958). The legislation was first enacted in 1925; 43 Stat. 883
(1925), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1946). It was enacted into positive law by Act, July 30,
1947, c. 392, 61 Stat. 670, without changing any of its provisions and designated
officially as Title 9 U.S.C.
The heart of the Act is contained in §§ 2, 3, 4. § 2 makes "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable" written provisions for arbitration in contracts involving interstate com-
merce and maritime transactions; § 3 provides for a stay of action in federal courts
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